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sion the Fabiani rule appears the most efficacious method thus far propounded.
So, the last of the propositions that may be asserted against constructive custody appears as inapplicable as those preceding it. Moreover, positive justification exists for the suggested extension, since
earlier availability of judicial review will more fully protect the registrant's individual liberty without obstructing realization of the country's
mobilization goals.

FEDERAL VENUE AND THE CORPORATE PLAINTIFF:
JUDICIAL CODE SECTION 1391 (c)
In 1948 Congress revised the Judicial Code with the passage of
the Judicial and Judiciary Act; Section 1391(c) treats the difficult
problem of corporate venue in the federal courts.' A court must, before
it can adjudicate, gain jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties involved. With jurisdiction obtained, the question of proper
venue must be settled. While Section 1391 (c) explicitly allows a corporation, in diversity of citizenship cases, to be sued in a federal district
where it is incorporated, licensed to do, or is doing, business, it raises
a question with regard to its meaning for the corporate plaintiff.
The persistent problem of reconciling the migratory nature of
corporations with an inclination to confine their efficacy has plagued the
courts since the nation's founding. An indelible and virtually unchallenged theory of non-migration prevailed until EX Parte Schollenberger2
"displaced metaphor with common sense." 3 In the light of acquiescence
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (Supp. 1952).
"(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship
may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where
all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.
"(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, except as
otherwise provided by law.
"(c) A corporationmay be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated
or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded
as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes."
28 U.S.C. § 1391 (Supp. 1952). (emphasis added)
2. 96 U.S. 369 (1877). This case was based on two earlier opinions. Chicago and

Northwestern Ry. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270 (U.S. 1871); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v.
Harris, 12 Wall. 65 (U.S. 1870).
3.

Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 169 (1939).

NOTES
in the activity of concerns outside their state of incorporation, exemption from suit in foreign states became unacceptable. The Schollenberger decision, interpreting the 1875 venue statute, 4 concluded that a
corporation, by designating an agent in a state, would render itself
amenable to service of process there.5 The improper venue defense,
Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporationpronounced, is waived
by selection of an agent even without the 1875 statute. 6 Compliance with
state law abrogated the privilege of objecting to venue in districts wherein
a company could not otherwise be compelled to answer. 7 Between 1939
and the 1948 legislation, courts utilized the "consent to venue" fiction as
8
enunciated by Neirbo and extirpated by Section 1391 (c).
The revised Code requires the laying of venue where all plaintiffs
or all defendants reside in diveisity cases and where all defendants are
situated in non-diversity litigation, both situations subject to provisions
in other laws.9 Section 1391(c) unequivocally states that "[a] corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or
licensed to do business or is doing business . .." but the next phrase,
"and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such
corporation for venue purposes," requires exploration to discern a
credible interpretation.
A trio of district court judges has examined the position of the
corporate plaintiff under Section 1391 (c). Freiday v. Cowdin'0 and
Hadden v. Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co. 1 sanctioned a firm's laying
venue where it was doing business. Citing only Professor Moore, who
ignored the issue of a corporation as plaintiff,12 and a law review note,
4. "[N]o civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts against any person
by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an
inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving such process or commencing such proceedings ..... " 18 STAT. 470 (1875).

5. The phrase, "in which he shall be found," was removed in order to stop service
against natural persons wherever they might be caught. 24 STAT. 552 (1887) ; see Neirbo
Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 171 (1939).
6. 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
7. These state laws vary in their requirements. For examples of such laws and
cases which interpret them, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2852-1001 through 2852-1016
(Supp. 1951), Robinson v. Coos Bay Pulp Corp., 147 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1945) ; TENN.
CoDE ANN. §§ 4118-4135 (Williams 1942), International Union of Mine, etc., Workers v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 31 F. Supp. 1015 (ERD. Tenn. 1940).
8. Ample legal writing discusses the conditions under which a corporation is deemed
to come within the rule of the Neirbo case. E.g., Comment, 42 ILL. L. REv. 780 (1948);
13 Gzo. WAsH. L. Ra,. 244 (1945) ; 27 NE. L. REv. 595 (1948).
9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a), (b) (Supp. 1952).
10. 83 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
11. 105 F. Supp. 530 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
12. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 2142-2143 (2d ed. 1948). The court seemingly mis-
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whic' intiniates an aparent ability to initiate an action in such a distrit,'.1.the Freiday opinion demonstrates the paucity of authoritative
comment on the subject. -Facing this dearth of authority, the court
presumed a congressional desire to allow a corporation to sue in the
district where it does business. A contrary conclusion would impute
to the legislature an amorphous scheme of delineating the residence of a
corporate defendant, but not a corporate plaintiff; furthermore, the "and
such" phrase would otherwise be a mere superfluity, and an inequitable
unbalance would permit a suit against a corporation where commencement of proceedings by the same company was prohibited. More
recently, the Hadden case has followed the Freiday opinion, contending
that an antithetical finding would necessitate a lucid legislative declara4
tion of such intention.'
Denial of a privilege to file a claim wherever a corporation engages
ih activity occurred between the Freiday and Hadden cases in Chicago
and Northwestern Ry. v. Davenport; 5 tracing the legislative and judicial
history of venue in the United States, the judge noted a disposition to
limit the residence of corporate bodies for purposes of litigation.' 6 For
example, Neirbo and the doctrine of waiver grew out of Schollenberger,
but the former decision itself referred to an 1887 bill which would have
17
severely restricted venue of corporate parties in the district courts.
uses the statement of Professor Moore by citing it to support its position with regard
to corporate plaintiff whereas the writer omits discussion of the plaintiff at that point.
13., 60 HA1v.L. REv. 424, 435 (1947).
14.. The court in Hadden recognized opposition by two text writers. 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 42 (Supp. 1951) ; 1-A OHLINGER, FEDERAL PRAcTiCE 297 (1950).
Although Professor Moore is cited in the Freiday case as supporting authority,
he has disagreed with the holding in that case. "Query whether 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (c) was
not intended to apply to a corporate defendant only.... It would seem that the Delaware
corporation could not have maintained the action in New York notwithstanding that a
suit could be brought against it in New York." MOORE'S COMMENTARY ON THE U.S.
JUDICIAL CODE 178, 194 (1949), states, "[T]he Code has made no change in this rule
relative to the residence of a corporate plaintiff."
In referring to § 1391(c), Ohlinger says, ". . . it does not make the corporation a
resident of the state so that as plaintiff it may lay the venue of an action in which jurisdiction is invoked only on the ground of diversity, in that state." This comment. cited
Guth v. Groves, 44 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) as authority; however, the case was
decided before § 1391 (c) was enacted. The Freiday case was also cited, but Ohlinger
conceded that it is contra.
15. 94 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
16. Cf. Suttle v. Reich Bros. Construction Co., 333 U.S. 163, 166 (1948).
17. This section prohibited resort to the federal courts by foreign corporations
authorized to do local business. It was passed by the house three times. 10 CONG. REc.
1304 (1880); 14 CoNG. REc. 1244-1255 (1883); 15 CONG. REc. 4879 (1884). But the
Senate allowed the bill to die in committee each time. 10 CONG. REc. 1340 (1880) ; 14
CONG. REc. 1270 (1883); 15 CONG. REc. 4909 (1884). The House passed it again in
1887 as part of H.R. 2441. 18 CONG. REC. 613 (1887). This time the Senate amended

NOTES
The accuracy
in Freiday is
vision; thus,
meaning that

of an assertion that Congress intended the result reached
repudiated by the haunting reminiscence of the 1887 prothe tribunal would not read into statutory language a
was non-existent in fact.'

Validity of such ratiocination can be doubted at least to the extent
of attesting to its inconclusiveness; in the past, corporate litigation has
been restrained by court and legislature, but, on the other hand, there is
no denying either the current tendency to liberalize venue statutes 19 or20
the fact that corporate activity extends beyond state boundaries.
a comUndoubtedly in many instances valid reasons exist for allowing
21
therein.
non-resident
a
sue
pany doing business in a district to
Whether Congress intended only to embrace and expand the Neirbo
rule applicable to corporate defendant, or to contemplate the corporate
plaintiff, remains the salient inquiry in attempting to interpret Section
1391(c). Most commentators who discuss the provision take for
granted the former position, 22 but one of the exceptors to this general
attitude, Professor Wechsler, maintains that "when the corporation is a
plaintiff it will be able in diversity cases to lay venue in any district in
which it does business." 23 The few volumes on procedure written since
1948 do not mention the possibility of such an innovation ;24 it would
the bill, specifically striking out the section before passing the bill. 18 CONG. Rxc. 2543

(1887).

18. All of this discussion by the court makes no effort to assign any meaning to
the problem phrase of Section 1391(c).
An interesting sidelight on the Davenport case is that the judge who heard the case
was serving as a federal judge under an interim appointment by the President and was
not confirmed by the Senate. An application made to his successor to set aside the order
of dismissal and to transfer to Texas where most of the defendants resided was granted.
See Chicago & Northwestern Ry. v. Davenport, 95 F. Supp. 469 (S.D. Iowa 1951).
19. See Freiday v. Cowdin, 83 F. Supp. 516, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); 3 MOORE, FEDFRAL PRAcrIcE 2143 (2d ed. 1948) ; 3 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE 31 (3rd ed.

1951).
20. Williams v. Green Bay & Western R.R., 326 U.S. 549, 553 (1946).
21. The Davenport case was brought in Iowa, where the corporation was doing
business, for several reasons: (1) to bring the action "near the physical location of
witnesses, whose presence at the trial would be necessary to establish all the facts";
(2) to determine the meaning of the contract as quickly as possible and to see what
type of business enterprise the defendant conducted; (3) the Freiday case, then the only
authority, declared this to be possible; (4) it seemed that if a corporation could be
sued where doing business it should have the corresponding right to maintain a suit
in such a district. Communication to the INDIANA LAw JOURNAL from Mr. Frank Davis,
attorney for the plaintiff, Chicago & Northwestern Ry.
22. E.g., Bethell and Friday, The Federal Judicial Code of 1948, 3 ARK. L.

REv.

146, 149 (1949); Harris, Survey of the Federal Judicial Code, 3 SOUTHWESTEmN L.J.
229, 235 (1949).
23. Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 240, n. 126 (1948).
24. 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACriCE AND PROCEDURE § 80 (Supp. 1952)
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thus seem that those who are most thoroughly acquainted with the
Judicial Code revision either considered the change favoring the corporate plaintiff as being obvious and indisputable, or did not recognize
the possibility of the judicial interpretation in Freiday and Hadden.
Little aid may be gained from an examination of legislative history
since Section 1391 appears to have occasioned no debate; if Congress
contemplated the extension here discussed, the language used must have
been deemed explicit enough to accomplish the desired result. 25 Representative Keogh 26 and Senator Donnell, 27 in commenting on the entire
1948 revision, each advanced the view that the bill did not include controversial changes whenever they could be avoided; reviser's notes2 8 and
declarations by Professor Moore, who served as special consultant to the
advisory committee of the House Judicial Committee,2 9 substantially
parallel these statements. The foregoing seems to indicate congressional
intent to merely include an expanded Neirbo rule, without going further,
because the grant of a previously unyielded privilege to corporation plaintiffs would be disputatious. 80 It could also support a finding of intention to allow suit by a company where doing business on the ground
that to do so would not be controversial. 3' The latter view would
abrogate the necessity of questioning the existence of the concluding
(the authors merely point out the conflict between the Freiday and Davenport decisions
without declaring their preference); 3 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE 33-34 (3d
ed. 1951) ; TALBOTr, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND THE COURTs 76 (1950).
25. A special pamphlet published in 1948 by U.S. Code Congressional Service contains legislative history, reviser's notes, and congressional debate and discussion of the
1948 revision.
26. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on Judiciary on H.R.
1600 and H.R. 2055, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947).
27.

94 CONG. REc. 7928 (1948).

28. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1391-1406 (Supp. 1952). These are referred to in H.R. REP.
No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1948), which says, ".. . minor changes were made
in the provisions regulating the venue of district courts in order to clarify ambiguities
or to reconcile conflicts. These are reflected in the revisor's notes under sections 13911406."
29. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3541, 3544 (2d ed. 1948). Professor Moore testified
on H.R. 2055, which was substantially the same as H.R. 3214, the bill that was finally
passed. In referring to venue, he said: "Venue provisions have not been altered by
the revision. Two changes of importance have, however, been made. Improper venue
is no longer grounds for dismissal of an action in the federal courts. Instead the
district court is to transfer the case to the proper venue. See Section 1406. And Section
1404 introduces an element of convenience which gives the court the power to transfer
a case for the convenience of parties and witnesses to another district" Hearings before
Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on Judiciary on H.R. 1600 and H.R. 2055, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1947).
30. These men endeavor to prove that legislation prior to 1948 had definite intent
to limit venue. See King v. Wall and Beaver Street Corp., 145 F.2d 377, 380 (D.C. Cir.
1944), which discusses such limitations.
31. There have been only three cases in four years, which fact might indicate that
the Congressmen were unaware any controversy would arise.
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phrase of the section, while the contrary holding might require attribution to Congress of an "anomalous intent to define the residence of
' 3 2corporate defendants but not that of corporate plaintiffs.
Whatever the legislative intent, if indeed an ascertained intent
existed, the statutory language does not facilitate its discovery. Assuming the superfluity of the problem phrase, a period after business would
have solved the problem; or, if the phrase had been introduced as a
separate sentence, it could be interpreted as merely a clarification of the
preceding sentence. Instead, inclusion of the terminology, "and such
. .." leads to the belief that something new has been added to what has
gone before. Section 1391 (a) allows venue to be laid where all plaintiffs, or all defendants, reside; omitting that portion of Section 1391 (c)
pertaining solely to defendants, it reads: The "judicial district in which
it [the corporation] is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing
business . . .shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for
venue purposes."'3 3 Certainly a conclusion permitting instigation of an

action in a state where a company is engaged in commercial activity
is not repugnant to this language. 34
Logical arguments can thus be assembled to support the conclusions
of Freiday and Hadden, or Davenport; none of them being conclusive,
it would perhaps be.best to seek other avenues to a just solution.3 5
32. Freiday v. Cowdin, 83 F. Supp. 516, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).

33. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (Supp. 1952).
34. The brief for an appeal of the Freiday decision, which was later withdrawn by
stipulation, contains an interesting grammatical argument at pp. 10-11, the judgment of
which is left to the reader. "The section [1391(c)] consists of a single sentence and
the subject matter of that sentence is the place where 'a corporation may be sued.' The
-provision of the last part of the sentence does not, and does not purport to, introduce
or deal with the entirely different subject matter, namely, where a corporation can
bring suit. On the contrary, the last part of the sentence relates to 'such corporations,'
which necessarily means a defendant corporation."
The brief cites Schoen v. Mountain Producers Corp., 170 F.2d 707, 713, n. 10 (3d
Cir. 1948), which states, "[b]ut Section 1391(c) of revised Title 28 very substantially
broadens the venue as to corporate defendants." Communication to the INDIANA LAW
JOURNAL from Mr. H. G. Pickering, attorney for the defendant Cowdin. However, this
does not preclude the possibility that venue was also broadened in order to embrace the
corporate plaintiff.
35. Another approach to elucidation of the ambiguous expression consists of endeavoring to define residence, but the use of reside in Section 1391 (a) implies that
Congress affected no hidden or peculiar meaning of the word in Section 1391(c). A
restrictive definition of residence would attribute to the legislators an intent to vary
the interpretation of reside and residence within a statute.
Court pronouncement on the word reside in Section 1391 (c) may be found in Dalton
v. Shakespeare Co., 196 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1952). For excellent discussion of the various
views of reside)ce, see Suttle v. Reich Bros. Construction Co., 333 U.S. 163 (1948);
M incy v. Detroit & Cleveland Nay. Co., 94 F. Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ; Jakubowski
v. Central R.R., 88 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Bagner v. Blidberg Rothchild Co.,
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A predilection for conducting trials in the best possible place forms
the foundation of venue theory. Even after the venue statute is satisfied, a court may refuse to accept a case. Prior to 1948, such refusal
resulted in dismissal based on the judicial doctrine forwm non conveniens; 36 by enactment of Judicial Code Section 1404,37 however,
Congress accepted and modified the doctrine, allowing transfer to another
district or division in which the suit could originally have been brought. 38
The following are some of the considerations upon which a court will
base its decision whether or not to accept or transfer a case: private
interests of the litigants; sources of proof; cost of obtaining attendance
of reluctant witnesses; practicability of viewing premises, if necessary;
and administrative difficulties.3 9 Plaintiff has first choice of the forum,
and Section 1404 should not be invoked "unless balance in the defendant's favor is shown by clear and convincing evidence" ;4o though ample
importance ought to be accorded his selection, it should not create a
result unjust to the defendant.
Coalescence of Section 1391 (c), allowing suit by plaintiff in
proximity to the situs of the cause of action, and Section 1404, avoiding
injustice by use of the court's discretion, 4 1 whether consciously or intuitively intended by Congress, should provide a sound result. Such
84 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Pa. 1949); Wagner Mfg. Co. v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 84 F.
Supp. 211 (S.D. Ohio 1949); 3 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE 26 (3d ed. 1951).
Mr. Leonard S. Lyon of Los Angeles, arguing before the Supreme Court in Gulf
Research & Development Co. v. Leahy, 21 U.S.L. WREx 3113 (U.S. Oct. 28, 1952),
maintained that Section 1391 had changed the meaning of the word resident. He said
that resident now means where the corporation is doing business, which is more realistic
in view of modern conditions. The court was considering Section 1391 in relation to
Section 1400. There was a four to four split, the court finding itself unable to decide
the relation.
For diversity jurisdiction, residence must be defined as the place of incorporation,
while for venue purposes residence is where the corporation is "incorporated or licensed
to do business or is doing business."
36. For a discussion of forum non conveniens and its adoption in § 1404, see Jiffy
Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1949) ; Aircraft Marine
Products, Inc. v. Burndy Engineering Co., 96 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. Cal. 1951); United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 83 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1949); United
States v. National City Lines, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Cal. 1948) ; Hayes v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. R.R., 79 F. Supp. 821 (D. Minn. 1948).
37. "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Supp. 1950).
38. Ibid.
39. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1946) ; Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual
Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1946).
40. Gulf Oil Corp v. Gilbert, supra note 39.
41. New York, C. & St. L. R.R. v. Vardaman, 181 F.2d 769, 770 (8th Cir. 1950).
Application of Section 1404, says the court, depends upon the exercise of the "sound
judicial discretion of the trial court"

NOTES
merger at least ascribes to the lawmakers a justifiable policy. This
approach is perceived by the Freiday case when, referring to the 1948
revision, the court declared that Section 1391(c) "appears to be in line
with the Congressional intent to liberalize the statutes dealing with venue,
while reserving the right to the courts to transfer actions which have
42
been laid in the wrong forum.1
Few arguments have been volunteered questioning the propriety of
the Freiday-Hadden result. The strongest contention is provided by
the defense in the Davenport case, 43 which asserts that the Freida,
determination does "violence to the long settled principle that a defendant
is (within certain exceptions) entitled to be sued in his own area of

residence.

.

..

"44

and creates the possibility of a company doing business

in California "catching" a defendant in that state, though the latter
resided in New York. This practical proposition arouses greater concern
than any abstract disapprobation of Freiday-Hadden.
Currently in existence, however, are several rules that may cause a
defendant inconvenience similar to that which some fear will be caused
by the proposed interpretation of Section 1391(c). In any diversity
case either the plaintiff or defendant must necessarily suffer some inconvenience; for example, under Section 1391 (a) an individual plaintiff
is allowed to bring suit where he resides, and a company may do the
same where it is incorporated; but, these privileges usually cannot be
abused, since a person, either individual or corporate, ordinarily maintains only one place of residence. A nation-wide firm might, to harass
or weaken the defense, seek to serve its opponent as far from his customary residence as possible. A company sued where it is conducting
its usual Activities can probably defend itself there as well as at its home
base, having competent personnel available in both places, but an individual may be extremely ill-prepared to defend an action at a distance
45
from his home.
The saving factoi-, vindicating the Freiday-Haddenposition, remains
the presence of forun non conveniens, as enacted in Section 1404. Un42. Freiday v. Cowdin, 83 F. Supp. 516, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
43. Brief for defendant passhi, Chicago & Northwestern Ry. v. Davenport, 94 F.
Supp. 83 (S.D. Iowa 1950), and communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from
Mr. John J. McKay, attorney for Davenport.
44. Brief for defendant, supra note 43. Compare this argument with that by the
corporation attorney in regard to the long established federal policy of trying cases as
close to the cause as possible, see note 21 supra.
45. In Note, 34 VA. L. REv. 811, 822 (1948), the suggestion is made that Section
1404 resulted at least in part from the Neirbo doctrine; it is to provide a method of
eliminating inconvenience and injustice to a corporation being sued.
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doubtedly, there are instances where a concern should be permitted to
initiate an action where it is doing business, and there are also situations
in which such suit would be disproportionately detrimental to the interests
of the defendant. Coordinate use of Sections 1391(c) and 1404 will
bestow the initial privilege upon the plaintiff corporation, while leaving
the prevention of trials conducted in improper forums to the discretion
of the court.
Interpretation of the statute herein suggested results in operation
designed both to achieve just results and avoid unnecessary inconvenience
to the parties involved. If Congress desired a different meaning, it thus
becomes its duty to clarify the matter by amendment.

MEDICAL DEDUCTION:

SCOPE AND PURPOSE

As long ago as 1848 John Stuart Mill, although not advocating
progressive taxation, advanced a theory whereby amounts necessary to
maintain the health of an individual would be exempt from taxation.'
Since the federal tax system is a progressive one, hence inferably more
responsive to ability to pay, one would imagine that an effective medical
deduction would by now be embedded in the federal income tax structure. But a puzzling ambiguity has recently arisen which makes it
impossible to predict the deductibility of an expenditure that might also
confer incidental non-medical benefits upon the taxpayer.
The Internal Revenue Code allows the deduction of expenses for
the "medical care" of the taxpayer or his dependents, 2 and rather vaguely
defines that care as including "amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease or for the purpose of
affecting any structure of the body."' 3 Because congressional comment,
1. MILL, PRINCIPALS OF POLITICAL ECONOmY 828 (Ashley Ed. 1926).
2. The only requirement for a "dependent" is that he receive more than half his
support from the taxpayer. See I.T. 4034, 1950-2 Cumt. BULL. 28 (the deduction was
allowed for a married daughter) ; I.T. 3703, 1945 Cume. BULL. 127 (the deduction was
allowed for the expenses of a person making more than $500 per year, but nevertheless
receiving more than half her support from the taxpayer).
3. 26 U.S.C. § 2 3(x). A medical expense as defined in this section would potentially include almost everything for which money could be spent. See Hodgkin, If You
Eat to Stay Healthy-Here's New Light on the Medical Deduction, 30 TAXES 206
(1952), in which the author facetiously describes a fictitious case where the Tax Court
allows the deduction of everything from whisky to cigarettes.

